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SEc. 14. Who must execute the power-Acceptance and resigna-

tion of trusts-Death of trustee or donee of power.-Where the
power of sale is executed by the person named, no question can
arise. Questions more frequently occur where vacancies have been
occasioned by removal, death, resignation, or. refusal to act.
The law will not compel any person to accept the office of a
trustee; and before acceptance, he may refuse or disclaim the office
at will. But after acceptance (which may be shown by any evidence showing his assent to the trust: supra, sec. 6), he cannot
resign or lay it down without the assent of the beneficiary or the
decree of a Court of equity: Drane vs. Cunter, 19 Ala. 731 ; 8
Yerg. 257. And will be compelled to concur in ministerial acts
requisite for the proper discharge of the trust: Hill on Trust. 307,
545, 551; 21 Il. 148.A naked power to sell, not coupled with an interest, must be
executed by all, and does not survive. But when coupled with an
interest or a trust (see sec. 9,. supra), it does survive ; and if
a portion of the trustees renounce or refuse to execute the trust,
or from any cause be duly discharged under a power in the deed
or under a decree of Court, the legal title to the estate, as well as
the office of trustee, will devolve upon the others who do accept the
trust, and these may execute- it: Williams vs. Otey, 8 Humph.
562; 2 Id. 367; Hill on Trust. 175; 3 Paige 420. If all decline
but one, he may execute it:. Taylor vs. Benham, 5 How. (U. S.)
233; Scull vs. Beeves, 2 Green Ch. 84. So on the death of part
of the trustees, the survivors take the entire legal estate, and may
execute the trust. And this though it is not expressly so provided
in the deed: ttannah vs. Carrington,18 Ark. 104; Parsons vs.
-Boyd, 20 Ala. 118 ; 12 Ala. 672; 10 Peters 532; Franklin vs.
Osgood, 14 Johns. R. 527. -On the death of the last trustee, his
interest vests in his executor or heir, according to the nature of
the property: in the heir, if real property, in the executor, ifpersonal estate. And this although the statute may grve to the Courts
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a cumulative right to appoint trustees in the place of those deceased:
M auldin vs. Armistead, 14 Ala. 708, and cases; Hill bn Trust.
175.
On the death of the trustee named, a substituted trustee does
not take the legal estate, but it passes, according to the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the heirs at law of
the first trustee, and hence, such heirs must be parties to proceedings in Court relative to the execution of the trust and the conveyance of the-estate: Greenleafvs. Queen, 1 Peters 138. Other
Courts hold that on the appointment of a new trustee (even where
the statute and decree making the appointment are silent as to any
change or transfer of the title), the title or estate vests by implication in the new trustee appointed by the court, so as to enable him
to peiform the trusts: Woolridge vs. iPlanters'-Bank, 1 Sneed
297 ; Goss vs. Singleton, 2 Head 67 ; 0'ibs vs. Aarsh, 2 Met.
243, 253; .Duffy vs. "OCvert,6 Gill 487.
If the power of sale is given to the creditor, ,,his administrators and assigns," the power, not being destroyed by death of
the donee thereof,-may be carried into effect by his administrator:
Doolittle vs. Lewis, 7 Johns. Ch. 45; Turner vs. Johnson, 7 Ohio
216, 220, part 2; Collinsvs. Ropkins, Admr., 7 Iowa 463; supra,"
sec. 9. And if the mortgagee, in such a case, dies non-resident
his administrator, by virtue of his foreign appointment, may legally
execute the power of sale : Doolittlevs. Lewis, supra.. The administrator of mortgagee may sign notices of sale: 4 Minn. 25.
The power of sale, being an irrevocable part of the security
(supra, sec. 9), is not destroyed by an assignment of the debt, but
the benefit of the power passes to the assignee, who has a right to
call upon the trustee to sell. If part of the notes are assigned,
the security passes pro tanto: Sargent vs. Bowe, 21 Ill. 148;
Keyes vs. Wood, 21 Verm. 831, 550; 20 Ill. 162; 1 Paige 48; 11
Iowa 211; Id. 580; Anderson vs. Bumgartner, 27 Mo. 80, where
nature of assignee's interest, and how it may be lost, are discussed;
Wood vs. Snow, 1 Mich. 128 ; 29 Miss. 46 ; 4 Kent's Com. 147 ;
Slee vs. Manhattan Company, 1 Paige 48. See Wilson vs. Troup,
2 Cow. 195; s. c., 7 Johns. Ch. 25, holding that partialassignee
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of mortgagee with power of sale, cannot sell, the power being
indivisible.
SEc. 15. .When all the trustees must concur.-Where no different provision is made by the author of the trust, the general rule
is that all the trustees must join in executing the trust; but not,
of course, those who have renounced or been discharged. The
concurrence of a co-trustee is, however, sometimes presumed:
Vandever's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 405; Hill on Trust. 305, et seg.,
and note. When concurrence is necessary, or otherwise, see, in
addition, 9 Sm. & Mar. 839; 13 Id. 597.
Where empowered to act separately, yet if they elect to act
jointly, as by giving a joint notice of sale, one cannot afterwards
deny the authority of his c6-trustee, and act alone,-certainly not
where there is no room to presume the concurrence of the cotrustee: White vs. Watkins, 23 Mo. 423. The power to sell must
be pursued with precision. And the rule may be stated generally
thus: where the act to be done requires discretion, or joint deliberation, or united judgment, all must act, unless otherwise specially provided. It was accordingly held in Powell vs. Tuttle,
3 Comst. 396, overruling King vs. Stone, 6 Johns. Ch. 323,
where loan commissioners were authorized to advertise and sell on
default, that a sale by one (there being no provision that a less
number might act), without the presence and concurrence of both,
was for that reason void, and not capable of being rendered valid
by a conveyance in which both commissioners subsequently unite.
See, also, )Sherwood vs. Reade, 7 Hill. 431; Vandever's Aypeal, 8
W. & S. 405.
SEC. 16. New trustees, how created-y chancery and under the
power.-When, from any cause, a vacancy in the office of a trustee
occurs, it may be filled, 1st. By the appointment of a Court of
Chancery; 2d. Under a power contained in the trust instrument.
Where the trustees named die, neglect or refuse to act, or-remove
from the State, or from any cause, such as lunacy (2 Barb. Ch.
381), confirmed intemperance (1 Halst. Ch. 513), become incapable
of acting, or where they have been guilty of breaches of trust, or
have combined to defraud the creditor, Courts of equity freely
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exercise their jurisdiction to appoint new trustees: White vs.
Hampton, 10 Iowa 288; Gale et ux., R. M. Charlt. 109; 8 Green
Ch. 13; 2 Story Eq. 527; Lewin on Trust. 597; Gamble vs.
Dabney, 20 Texas 69; 14 Ala. 708; Drane vs. Gunter, 19 Id.
781; Gullum vs. Bank of Mobile, 23 Id. 797; Hill on Trust.
191, note and cases; 2 Bland Ch. 167, 322, 434; Sturges vs.
Knapp, 31 Verm. 1. Or will compel the trustees named to proceed
and sell:. Sargent vs. Howe, 21 Ill. 148; Hill on Trust. 807.
If there is a power contained in the trust instrument authorizing
it, new trustees may be created or appointed by those persons or
officers to whom the- power is expressly given, and in the manner
therein pointed out, but not otherwise.
In many instruments which have fallen under our observation,
the power of appointment in case of the death or refusal of the
trustee to act, is conferred upon the county or probate judge, or
some other permanent officer. Where the power exists, and is
properly exercised, the appointment is valid, even when made by
the creditor himself. The designated mode must be followed; but
it is sufficient if the intent of the author of the power is fairly
executed. Thus, where creditors have the power to substitute a
trustee, and are not required to unite in the same instrument, they
may make the appointment by separate instruments, executed at
difflerent times, if this does not contravene any expressed intent
of the grantor: Crosby vs. Hfuston, 1 Texas 225. So if the deed
gives the cestui que trust power, on the failure or refusal of the
trustee to act, to appoint another, without requiring it to be in
writing, such appointment, Where the property ±o be sold is personal, may be by parol; and where the debts are due in instal.
ments, the power is not exhausted by one appointment: Foster vs.
Goree, 4 Ala. 440.
SEc. 17. Liabilit/for acts of co-trustee.-This liability is not so
stringently enforced in this country as it would seem to be in
England. In the absence of agreement or fraud, one trustee is
not generally liable for the act of his co-trustee. In a case arising
under an instrument such as we are now considering, 0. J. MAR-.
SHALL stated the rule in this wise :-In a fair, regular transaction

,11o

SALES AND TITLES UNDER DEEDS OF TRUST.

one trustee is not liable for money received by his co-trustee
merely because he joined in the receipt. But if the transaction is
not fair and regular, as where the trustee who receives the money
had no right to receive it, the co-trustee who joins in the receipt
and thus co-operates in a breach of the trust, will be liable for the
failure of the trustee thus receiving it to pay it over to the beneficiary.' Wallis vs. Thornton, 2 Brockenb.'422; 2 Ala. 86.
The rule as stated by Mr. Story (Eq. Jurisp. sec. 1280) is very
generally followed. This subject not being entirely within the
scope of this article,,we refer generally for full discussion both as
to directory and discretionary trusts, to Toun8ley vs. Sherburne, 2
Lead. Cas. Eq. 806; Wharton's note to Hill on Trust. 809;
Deaderickvs. Cantrell,10 Yerg. 263; MClurrayvs. Montgomery,
2 Swan 374; 1 H. & G. 11; 7 Gill & J. 157; 3 Gill 366;
Griffin vs. Macaulay, 7 Gratt. 476; Worth vs. MoAdden, 1 Dev.
& Batt. (Eq.) 199.
SEe. 18. Comrensatirn of trustees, and who liable therefor.While the subject of the compensation of trustees does not strictly
come within the purpose of this article, a brief reference to some
of the cases arising under deeds of trust may be useful. If the
instrument provides for compensation, that governs. But if no
such stipulation is made, the trustee is not entitled to compensation for responsibility assumed or to commissions for making sale.
He will be allowed necessary expenses, including in proper cases
attorney's fee, auctioneer's and clerk's hire, but the court will
guard the fund with jealous care even as to these: Constant vs.
MTkatteson, 22 Ill. 546; Allen vs. Bobbins, Am. L. Reg., Vol. 2
(N. S.) 442.
Where the trust deed provided no compensation, and the trustee
performed no service and the debtor voluntarily paid the debt, the
1 As to liability to beneficiary, see generally, Lewin on Trusts, 2 Law Lib. 186.
If the trustee in making the sale is guilty of a flagrant breach of trust, and the
property is sold to a third person honi2 fide, the trustee may be charged with the
full value of the property sold. Hunt vs. Bass, 2 Dev. (Eq.) 292; Johnson vs.
.Eason, 8 Ire. (Eq.) 830.
Liability of mortgagee to debtor for improper exercise of the power to sell, see
infra, See. 20 and note.
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trustee has no claim for commissions or compensation against the
latter: T'etmore vs. Brown, Am. Law Reg., Vol. 2 (N. S.) 125.
If the trustee, by direction of the creditor, advertises the premises
and incurs expenses improperly, as when nothing is due or payable by the terms of the conveyance, he must look for payment'
for such services and expenses, to the creditor, and net the
borrower: Id.
Merely being named as trustee in a deed of trust-no service
lveing performed-does not raise an implied promise on the part
of the .beneficiary to pay him commissions or otherwise: Catlin
vs. Mover, 4 Texas 151.
If a much larger sum is claimed in the published notice of sale
than is due, the court will not compel the debtor to pay the
expense of advertising: Fechte vs. Brownell, 8 Paige 212.
For proper charges and allowances the trust property is liable:
Constant vs. Matteson, 22 Ill. 546; Allen vs. Bobbins, 2 Am. Law
Reg. (N. S.) 442. But the employee of trustee has no lien on
the trust estate: Jones vs. Dawson, 19 Ala. 672. So a promise
of extra compensation made by the debtor to the trustee at the
sale, is a personal claim against the promissor, and cannot be taken
out of the proceeds of sale:' 3 Md. 823.
SEc. 19. Trustees must act in person- What duties they may
delegate.-The trustee must act personally, and can'not delegate
any substantial part of his duties unless an express authority for
that purpose is conferred in the instrument creating the trust:
Doe vs. Robinson, 24 Miss. 688; Hill on Trust. 175. He is in..
capacitated from delegating any duty (unless the power is expressly
given) which involves the exercise of any discretion or judgment.
But if a particular thing is specially directed to be done in a prescribed manner, not requiring the exercise of judgment or discretion, he may as to this act by another :2 Singleton vs. Scott, 11
I On the general subject of compensation of trustees, see leading case of Robinion vs. Pett, and note by Mr. Rawle, L. Cas. in Eq, Vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 301 ; Schwartz
vs. Wendell, Walk. Ch. R. 267; 25 Ala. 426; Burr vs. fcEwen, 1 Bald. 154, 163;
2 Stockt. Oh. 263; 4 Harr. 154; Miller vs. Bererly, 4 lien. & MunL 415; 2 Dev.
(Eq.) 195; Id. '29; 8 Ire. (Eq.) 62; Id. 222; 6 Id. 137; 9 Rich. E'q. 474.
2 Singleton vs, Scott, above cited, which goes as far perhaps as can properly be
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Iowa 589; Pearson vs. Jamison, 3 McLean 197; Id. 69. Mere
mechanical or ministerial duties, as, for example, causing advertisements of sale to be fixed up, may be done by others: Powell
vs. Tuttle, 3 Comst., 896.
SEc. 20. Trustee must act in good faith,-impartially,and with
diligence and reasonable discretion.-The trustee, or mQrtgagee
with power of sale, is bound to act in good faith and take care of
and look to the interests of both parties, in the execution of the
power. "cTrustees should consider themselves impartial agents
for both parties, and act in all sales for the interest of the debtor
as well as the creditor." If a discretion is left with the trustee
he must exercise it in a reasonable manner. If- he unnecessarily
or unfairly prejudices the rights or interests of the debtor, the sale
will be set aside (as to which see infra, sees. 82-88) or he Vill be
personally responsible for the injury. He should not permit the
creditor to force the sale at an inadequate price in the absence of
other bidders, and should postpone the sale (infra sec. 29) if
necessary to obtain a fair price: Quarles vs. Lacy, 4 Munf. 251;
Bossett vs..Fisher,11 Grat. 492; Lane vs. Tidball, 1 Gilyer (Va.)
132; 11 Leigh 556; HJunt vs. Bass, 2 Dev. (Eq.) 292; Johnson
vs. Eason, 3 Ire. Eq. 330; Singleton vs. Scott, 11 Iowa 589, 597;
Jenks vs. Alexander, 11 Paige 619; Outwater vs. Berry, 2 Halst.
(Ch.) 63; Richards vs. Holmes, 18 How. 143. Not only must he
use good faith, but the same authorities teach that he must use
every requisite degree of diligence to bring the property to sale
under the best possible circumstances, at least so far as required
by his powers. Of course if the instrument directs bow he shall
proceed, and he has no discretion, it is sufficient if be fairly and
fully complies with its requirements. Still as to the time and
done, well illustrates the rule.

Here the holder of the note, without consultation
with or prior authority from the trustee, published a notice of sale, selected the
newspaper, and fixed the time of sale. The trustee was informed of this 4 day or
two before the sale, and was present and made the sale in person. As the instrument expressly fixed the place of sale, the terms, the length of notice, the court
held that the trustee had no discretion except to select the newspaper and fix the
time, and that his subsequent adoption of the selection made and time fixed,
placed the case upon the same footing as if the trustee hd acted in person from

the beginning. 11 Iowa 589.
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manner of sale, including the right to postpone when necessary,
&c., there-is usually some inherent or implied discretion, and this
must be exercised with fair and impartial attention to the interests
of all parties concerned. This subject will receive constant illustration as we proceed. We therefore dismiss it here by briefly
quoting from two illustrious Judges, one in lEngland and the other
in this country. The Yice-Chancellor in the quite recent case of
Mathie vs. Edwards, 2 Coll. 465 (A. D. 1846), holds this language,
and it is equally applicable where the power of sale is exercised
by a third person: ccA mortgagee having a power of sale cannot
as between him and the mortgagor exercise it in a manner merely
arbitrary, but as between them is bound to exercise some discretion; not to throw away the property, but to act in a prudent and
business-like manner with a view to obtain as large a price as may
fairly and reasonably, with due diligence and attention, be under
the circumstances obtainable." See, also, Hobson vs. Bell, 2
Beav. 17.
The mortgagee, says the late C. J. SitAw, 3 Met. 311, "in
exercising the power becomes the trustee of the debtor and is
bound to act b6nd fide and to adopt all reasonable modes of proceeding in order to render the sale the most beneficial to the
debtor." 1 See, also, Goldsmith vs. Osborne, 1 Edw. Ch. 561;
Driver vs. Fortner, 5 Port. (Ala.) 9. When equity will interfere
to control discretion of trustee, see Prewett vs. Laud, 36 Miss.
495; 11 Gratt. 348; Hill on Trust. 715, 725.
SEC. 21. Powers of sale strictly construed and must be precisely
pursued.-" Those," says HARRIS, J., in Powell vs. Tuttle, V
Comst. 396, " who are invested with the power of transferring one
man's property to another must pursue their authority with preci1 Where after power of sale has been exercised by the mortgagee he brings suit
for the balance duo on the note, it is a good defence to show that the sale was
fraudulently managed, and that with proper management the pledged property
would have been sufficient to pay the -whole debt: Howard vs. Ames, 3 Met. 308.
And this defence is not avoided by the fact that the mortgagor has the right of
redemption: Lowell vs. Noith, 4 31inn. 32. But if he acts fairly he is only
accountable for what he realizes at the sale, and may sue for and recover balance
of his debt: Sabin vs. Stfcaney, 9 Verm. 164.
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sion, or what they do will be invalid."
Indeed the principle is
undisputed and fundamental, that directions in powers of- sale must
be strictly, literally, and precisely pursued, and admit of no equivalent or substitution, however unessential they might otherwise
have been: Waldron vs. Ohasteny, 2 Blatchf. 62; Crosby vs.
Huston, 1 Texas 225; Taylor vs. Akins, 1 Burr. 60; Gunter vs.
Janes, 9 Cal. 643; Hawkins vs. Kemp, 3 'East 410; 10 Mo. 75;
1 Id. 520; 4 Kent Com. 147 ; infra, sec. 25. So strict is this
rule that the trustee cannot pursue any other mode than the designated one, though he thereby promotes the interest of those for
whom he acts: Greenleaf vs. Queen, 1 Pet. 138. Trustees derive
their power solely from the deed (supra, sec. 8), and if the power
is not thus strictly pursued the debtor is not barred of his equity
of redemption by the sale. See, in addition, Ormsby vs. Tarascon,
3 Litt. 405; -Bushvs. Stamps, 26 Miss. 463; Gray vs. Howard,
14 Mo. 341; Beebe vs. De Baum, 3 Eng. 510; -Fostervs. Goree,
4 Ala. 428.
If the mode is not defined and the power is general, it is an
authority to act in any mode which the law *ould' sanction or give
effect to: 1 Sugd. on Pow. 266; Poster vs. Goree, 4 Ala. 441;
Id. 483.
But where, as is usually the case, the manner is particularly
prescribed in the deed, or, as in some of the states, by statute,
this must, as we have shown above, be followed. A negative upon
any other mode of executing the power is implied by the designation of a specific mode.
SEC. 22. Same subject-The principleapplied and illustrated.It follows that a power to sell on default will not include the power
to lease or mortgage :1 4 Kent Com. 148; Walker vs. Britngard,
13 Sm. & Mar. 723. So if there are conditions precedent, these
must be complied with or the sale will not be valid': Roarfy vs.
lIfitchell, 7 Gray 243; Dutton vs. Cotton, 10 Iowa 408. Sor, if the
trust is to sell partly for cash and partly on credit, a sale wholly
I So if the trust property is slaves and the trustee is authorized to sell only, he
cannot apprentlee them, and if he does he must account for the value of their
services: Sparks vs. Kearney, 2 Jones (Eq.) 481.
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for cash will be set aside and a resale ordered: .Norman vs. Hill,
2 Patton & Heath 676. Where the power is to sell for sufficient
to pay the amount " then due at the time of such sale/' a sale for
an instalment due and for one not then due, is void and will be set
aside even where a stranger purchases :1 Ormsby vs. Tarascon, 3
Litt. 405. But if the trustee is empowered to sell on default of
the payment of interest, the sale will be valid though the principal
s not yet due: Biehard vs. Holmes, 18 Howard (U. S.) 143. If
the prescribed mode is a public sale, the trustee cannot sell at private sale: Greenleaf vs. Queen, i Pet. 138. Sureties if so authorized by the power may sell before being damnified, but if they
become the purchasers the debtor may redeem from them or their
grantees with notice: Thurston vs. .Prentiss,1 Mich. 194; s. c.
Walk. Oh. R. 529. Further as. to rights of sureties indemnified
by deed of trust, see Hawkins vs. May, 12 Ala. 673 ; 5 Port. (Ala.)
191; 15 Ala. 563; Roden vs. Jaco, 17 Ala. 844; Wiheeler vs.
Stone, 4 Gill 38; supra, sec. 7.
As to powers of sale to secure future advances, see Curling vs.
Shuttleworth, 6 Bing. 121. See Redfield's valuable article in
Am. Law Reg., Vol. 2 (N. S.), p. 1, as to validity, &c., of mortgages, for this purpose.
SEc. 28. A valid, subsisting power lies at the foundation of the
purchaser's title.-Trustees and mortgagees with power of sale
deriving their power as we have seen (supra,sees. 8, 15) solely
from the deed under which they act, it follows that a valid power
is necessary and lies at the very foundation of the purchaser's
title. If, therefore, the power has been extinguished by payment
or otherwise, no title will pass at a sale under it even to a bond
fide purchaser: Cameron vs. Irwin, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 272; Id. 246;
2 Id. 566; 21 Mo. 320; Ledyard vs. Chapin, 6 Port. (Ind.) 820 ;
S'herman vs. Sherman, 3 Port. (Ind.) 887; Wade vs. Harper, 8
Yerg. 383; supra, see. 10. And because payment of the debt
1 Mode of proceeding on sales where some of the instalments are not due or fall
due at different times: Cox vs. Wheeler, 7 Paige 248; Atussina vs. Bartlett, 8 Fort.
(Ala.) 277; 9 Id. 547; 1 Ala. 380; 1 Rand. 466; 1 Hopk. Ch. Rep. 569; Bolden
vs. Gilbert, 7 Paige 208.
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renders the instrument functus officio and ipso facto extinguishes
the power of salq, such bond fide purchaser takes no title even
though there has been no release, reconveyance, or other discharge
of the instrument of record.' See, in addition to cases last cited,
.Francisvs. Porter,7 Port. (Ind.) 213 ; 18 Johns. 7, 12; 21 Wend.
483; 26 Id. 541; 21 Ill. 149; 20 Ill. 165; Willard's Eq. 433;
Perkins vs. Dibble, 10 Ohio 433, 439; !Favernervs. .Robinson, 2
Rob. (Va.) 280; Furbish vs. Goodwin, 5 Foster 426. So if the
trustee has once sold enough to pay the debt, the power being
thereby extinguished, he cannot legally sell more: Chartervs.
Stevens, 3 Denio 33. And if the sale is a nullity, this. may be set
up even against a purchaser for value: The &tate,ft., vs. The
Bank, ft., 5 Ind. 353. But no. mere delay, even for ten years,
if the debt be still enforceable, will discharge the trust: Galt vs.
.Dibbrell,10 Yerg. 146. And a deed of trust to sell to pay a note,
if suit be brought on it, may be executed though the note is turned
into a judgment, and.more than six years have elapsed: Bank, '.,
vs. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. 19.
The power exists, and may be executed by a sale although the
creditor has a bill to foreclose pending-at the time: Brisbane vs.
Stoughton, 17 Ohio 482; Wilson vs. Troup, 2 Cow. 195; s. c. 7
Johns. Oh. 25. But if (as it seems he may do) be proceeds concurrently by suit at law and by proceedings under the power, a
1 But a trustee can only receive payment (where the note is -payable to the
beneficiary) when so authorized by the deed of trust. If by the instrument he is
authorized to receive money only when due and upon sale being made, payment to
him before due and without sale, the beneficiary not consenting; will not be good,
nor discharge the lien in equity: Wallis vs. Thornton, 2 ]3rockenb. 422. If intrusted with possession of the note this might give an independent authority to
receive payment.
Whether reconveyance is necessary; mode of release and satisfaction; by whom
to be made, &c., see, in addition to authorities in the text, Wolfe vs. Donnell, 13
Sm. & Mar. 103; Smith vs. Doe, 26 Miss. 291; 1 Freem. Ch. 105; .Howardvs.
Gresham, 27 Geo. 347 ; 3 Id. 345; Perkins vs. Sterne, 23 Texas 561 ; Harrison vs.
Hecks, 1 Port. (Ala.) 423; 16 Ala. 738; Lawrence vs. Farmers' Ins. Co., 3 Kern.
214; 22 Mo. 459; Ryan vs. Dunlap, 17 Ill. 40; Hannah vs. Carrington, IS Ark.
106; fagee vs. Carpenter, 4 Ala. 469; 3 Stew. & Port. 397; 1 Texas 239 et seq.;
4 Kent Com. 193; Briggs vs. Davis, 20 N.Y. 16; 1 Jones (Law) 169; 7 Ire. (Law)
418.
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subsequent judgment and collection of the amount on execution
will be held to be an election to abandon all prior proceedings
under the trust deed: Yourt vs. Hopkins, 24 Ill. 826. Further
as to election of.remedies; see Pay vs. Valentine, 5 Pick. 418.
SEC. 24. Same subjet-.Exception in favor of bond fide purchIasers under usurious and fraudulent securities.-There is an
important exception to the rule stated in the last section as to the
necessity of a valid power. It is held that a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, at a sale made under a power,
has a good title notwithstanding the mortgage is usurious, and the
statute declares the usurious contract and security utterly void:
Jackson vs. Henry, 10 Johns. 185; Monell vs. Lawrence, 12
Johns. 521; Thurston vs. Prentiss, 1 Mich. 197.
But it is otherwise if the usurious creditor himself becomes the
purchaser, or if the purchaser though a stranger to the usurious
contract has notice :1 Jackson vs. Dominick, 14 Johns. 435.
So a bond fide purchaser for value and without notice under a
deed of trust not void on its face, is not affected by any intended
fraud of the grantor in the deed of trust: -Ewing vs. Cargill,13
S. & M. 79; 3 Mason 465; Blair vs. Bass, 4 Blackf. 539.
S.. 25. Of the notice of sale-Necessity-Object-Directions
of power to be strictly complied with-Fraudulentnotices, &c.The grantor may authorize a valid private sale without notice, but
I The leading case is .acison vs. Henry, supra.

Although there is a-statute in

New York protecting bond fide purchasers, yet KENT, C. J., puts the decision,
which has ever since been adhered to, upon general principles of public policy
and the seeurity of titles.

He says-10 Johns. 196-if the party instead of arresting the sale "suffers it to go on and an innocent party to purchase, unconscious of the latent defect and without any means of knowing it, the purchaser
has the preferable claim in equity to protection." The principle of 'ackson vs.
i"fenry, which is that a power to sell under an usurious security is not void to all
intents and purposes, should not, in the opinion of DIr. Justice CowEN; (5 Hill 276),

be extended.

See also 14 Johns. 441; 2 Hill 566.

Hence it is held that if the

purchaser at the mortgage sale is not bona fide, and he has not obtained possession,
he can convey no better title than he acquired, and therefore the grantee of such
purchaser, although for value and without notice, is not protected from the.plea

of usury by the creator of the power.

And possession by the latter in such a

case, is, it seems, sufficient constructive notice to third persons of his rights:
Hyland vs. Stafford, 10 Barb. 558.
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this right is held to be impliedly abolished by statutes which direct
and regulate public sales under powers: Lawrence vs. I'he Farmer8', &c., Co., 3 Kern. 200, 210. The object of notice is that the
property may be advantageously sold. If proper notice is not
given, whether directed by the power or not, Chancery will set
aside the sale: 4 Kent 190; Anon., 6 Madd. 15. But if the kind
of notice is prescribed no other will do, and no further notice is
necessary. Hence if the power simply directs the trustee to advertise in a newspaper, he is not required to give any other kind
of notice or personally to notify the grantor or his assigns: Ormsby
vs. Tarason, 3 Litt. 405, 411. So if the statute points out a particular mode of notice, as, for example, that they be posted in a
particular place, no other mode, even though it be a better one,
can be substituted. Literal and precise conformity is required.
If this is impossible the remedy is in Chancery to foreclose by bill:
Dutton vs. Cotton. 10 Iowa 408; supra, sees. 21, 22.
If no particular form is prescribed, then no particular form is
required :' .Neman vs. Jackson, 12 Wheat. 570. If mortgagee is
deceased his administrator may sign notice of sale: Baldwin vs.
Allison, 4 Minn. 25; supra, see. 3, and note citing Minnesota
"
decisions.
In the absence of specific directions the trustee is invested with
a discretion which must be fairly exercised (s~ipra, see. 20). Thus
if the direction is to give notice for a specified time in " the newspaper" (not naming what paper, or where published), the trustee
has a discretion to select the paper, and if he acts fairly he maymake a valid sale: Singleton vs. Scott, 11 Iowa 589; 12"Wheat.
570, supra. If he has a discretion as to where notices shall be
posted he must act in good faith (see above, section 20), and if he
fraudulently post them in remote places the sale will be avoided or
the trustee made personally responsible: Johnson vs. -Eason. 3
I Notice as follows:-"By virtue of k deed of trust to the subscriber" (not

stating by whom made) "for the security of certain moneys therein mentioned.
will be exposed at public sale on," &c., (naming the day) -the following described
property. Sale to take place on the premises. T. M. G., Trustee :-held, sufficient, 12 Wheat. 570. Sufficiency of notice under New York Statute, see Judd vs.

O'Brien, 21 N. Y. 186; 2 Cowen 195.
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Ired. (Eq.) 330. So where the notice is fraudulently advertised
in a remote paper: Jencks vs. Alexander, 11 Paige 619. The
writer at Ni8i Prius set aside a sale where the notice was in the
English language, but inserted in a paper printed in the German
language. This was almost no notice at all, and gave less publicity than if it had all been in the latter tongue, as those among
whom the paper circulated could not read the notice, while those
who could read the latter generally did not and could not read the
former.'
Where the length of time is regulated by statute the legislature
may constitutionally reduce the time, as from 24 to 12 weeks, even
as to existing mortgages: James vs. Stull, 9 Barb. 482; but no
subsequent law can -be made which will injuriously affect the substantial rights of the creditor: Bronson vs. Kinsie, 1 How. (U. S4
311; 7 Blackf. 613; Id. 154; 8upra, sec. 3 and note.
SEC. 26. _Notie-Certainty and requisites as to Place-TimeDescription.-The notice should be certain as to place of sale
(Burnet vs. JDenniston, 5 Johns. Ch. 35) and time of sale (Gray
vs. Howard, 14 Mo. 341 ; 4 Minn. 437), and the descriptionof the
land must be sufficient reasonably to apprise the public of the
property intended to be sold: Newman vs. Jackson, 12 Wheat.
670. Omissions or inaccuracies in these respects, not calculated
to mislead and working no prejudice, will be disregaided. Thus
a sale was sustained where the notice of sale was for "cthe 28th
of December next," not naming the year :2 14 Mo. 341. So the
Court refused, under special circumstances, the town being small
and no injury being shown, to set aside a sale where the property
was advertised to be sold at "cthe town of St. Joseph :"3 Beattie
1 Where notice of sale was given for the 23d of May and the notice was after-

wards changed to the 25th of May without debtor's knowledge, he attending at
the time first fixed, it was held that a sale on the day last named conferred no

title: Dana vs. Farrington,4 Minn. 433 ; infra, sees. 28, 29.
2 It is better to specify the precise hour, but a notice specifying a certain day
between 12 and 5 o'clock was, in the absence of fraud or unfair practice, sustained:

Coz vs. HIalstead, 1 Green Ch. R. 311.
3 Notice of sale at ",City Hall" or "1Merchant's Exchange" is good, as by usage

such sales take place at the rotunda of those buildings; but to be good they must
take place at the rotunda: Horny vs. Coaner, 12 How. Pr. Rep. 490.
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vs. Butler, 26 Mo. 813. So as to inaccuracies of description
which would not mislead, or which stand self-corrected on the face
of the notice: 12 Wheat. 570, supra; White vs. Malcolm, 15 Md
529; Rathbonevs. Otark,9 Abbott's Pr. Rep. 12,66, note. In com.
puting time, ono day is to be excluded and the other included:
Bunce vs. Reed, 16 Barb. 350.
Notice of a sale "'once in each week for at least twelve successive weeks," is not given by twelve weekly insertions unless the
first preceded the sale eighty-four days or twelve full weeks:
Early vs. Doe, 16 Howard (U. S.) 610; Bunce vs. Reed, 16
Barb. 350; 4 Peters 849; 1 Wend. 90.
If "cthirty days' notice" is required, thirty days must elapse
between the first publication and the day of sale; and it was
further held, overruling contra dictum in -3G. Greene 483, that it
was not necessary that thirty days should elapse between the first
and last publication: Leffler vs. Armstrong, 4 Iowa 482. And the
publication must be in each week or number of the paper; that is,
the publication must be continued for the -requisite period: 4 Iowa
482; 3 G. Greene 433; 16 Barb. 850; 10 Mo. 75. " Twenty
days' notice in two daily newspapers" was required. Held not to
require twenty days' daily notice, or that the notice should be inserted twenty times in two daily papers: White vs. Halcolm, 15
Md. 529. See, also as to notice, Johnson vs. Dorsey, 7 Gill 286;
Gibs vs. Cunningham, 1 Md. Oh. 44.
SEc. 27. Notice-Bequisites of, as to truthfulness and amount
claimed.-The notice should be truthful in all material particulars.
Where the notice stated. that the premises would be sold for default of three mortgages, when in fact there were but two, othe sale
did not bar the equity Qf redemption: Burnet vs. Denniston, 5
Johns. Ch. 85; Johnson vs. Turner, 7 Ohio, part 2, p. 216. See
Mathie vs..Edwards, 2 Coll. 465, a striking case of a notice calcu- lated to mislead. Claiming too much to be due in the notice aoes not
make the sale void-certainly not if the excessive claim is not
made for a fraudulent purpose. It may afford ground, on a proper
case being made, to set aside the sale :1 MKlock vs. Cronkhite, 1 Hill
IWhere

the amount claimed in the notice exceeded by more than one-half the

amount due, the sale was set aside: Spencer vs. Anon. 4 Minn. 642.
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107; Jenks vs. Alexander, 11 Paige 619; Bunce vs. Beed, 16
Barb. 347. Sale is not void because the notice does not state the
amount of the debt: Wiswall vs. Boss, 4 Port. (Ala.) 321.
SEc. 28. Notice-Effect of want of.-If the fiotice is not publisLed for the requisite length of time, the sale is void, not merely
voidable; no title passes, and the purchaser cannot maintain ejectment or other action: Bunce vs. Reed, 16 Barb. 350, and cases;
Baldridge vs. Walton, 1 Mo. 520; Gibson vs. Jones, 5 Leigh 370;
Jackson vs. Clark, 7 Johns. 217, 226. And so if the sale is made
on the wrong day:' Miller vs. Hull, 4 Denio 104; -Danavs. Farrington, 4 Minn. 433. But defects in the publication of notice
were held to be cured by the lapse of a long time-in one case
sixteen years, in another, twenty-four years without objection-the
Court supplying the defects by presumption :-Bergen vs. Bennitt,
1 Caine's C. E. 1; Demarest vs. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Oh. 129.
Third persons cannot object that the trustee did not give proper
notice; this can only come from the grantor in the deed of trust,
or some person who sustained injury: Wightman vs. Doe (ejectment) 24 Miss. 675; Hillegas vs. Hillegas, 5 Barr 97; Casey ys.
('olvin, 11 Ala. 514; .Edmonson vs. Walsh, 27 Ala. 578 ; ITnfra
sec. 37.
SEC. 29. Adjournment of 8ale-Power implied-When and
how exercised.-The deed need not expressly give the trustee
power to adjourn. It is implied unless inhibited. He may adjourn,
giving proper notice, not only to a different time, but to a different
place: Richards vs. Hfolmes, 18 How. (U. S.) 143; Jackson vs.
Clark, 7 Johns. 217, 225 ; Sayles vs. Smith, 12 Wend. 57 ; Miller
vs. Hull, 4 Denio 104; Baldridge vs. Walton, 1 Mo. 520.
This is a matter of discretion which must be properly exercised;
18 How. 147. If few are present, and the bids lw, it is the
clear duty of the trustee to adjourn: Johnson vs. Eason, 3 Ired.
(Eq.) 336; supra, sec. 20.
.Regularly, the adjournment should be-on the day and at the
place of sale, and the same notice given 'which is required in the
first instance. When thus postponed, it need not be for the length
I A sale on Sunday, however improper it may be, is yet valid, not being a judicial proceeding, unless prohibited by statute: Saylcs vs. Smith, 12 Wend. 67.
VOL. XI.146
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of time at first required: Per SPENCER, J., 7 Johns. 217, 225.1 But
if notice of postponement before the day of sale be published, and
the sale is made on the day originally fixed, it is void and confers
no title : Jackson vs. Clark, 7 Johns. 217. So if the sale is
adjourned on the ground, the published notice of such adjournment
must conform to the adjournment previously announced, or the
sale will be void: Miller vs. Hull, supra; see. 25, supra, note 2,
As to republication of defective notice and postponement of sales,I
see also Cole vs. Moffit, 20 Barb. 18; Sayles vs. Smith, 12 Wend.
57; Westgate vs. Handlin, 7 How. Pr. R. 372.
SEc. 80. -Effect of sale in barring equity of redemption, and
cutting off subsequent incumbrancers--Effect of irregularsale, &c.
-In
sales under powers, two questions have been made: 1st.
Whether the donee of the power could lawfully selI without application to, and the previous order of, a Court of equity. 2. If so,
will such sale bar the equity of redemption?
On the first question; as we have seen (supra, sec. 8), there was
much doubt until it was fully and finally settled in England, in
A. D. 1802, by Clay vs. Sharpe, apud Sugd; on Vend., Appendix
No. 14. Since then, the validity of such sales without the prior
sanction of Court has been unquestioned: Corder vs. Morgan, 18
Yes. 844; Sims vs. Hfuntley, 2 How. (Miss.) 896. Clay vs. Sharpe
also decided that where a sale was regularly made under a power,
even though it was without the assent of the owner, and against
his resistance, the title passes to the purchaser. And because it
is unnecessary that he should do so, a Court of equity will not
entertain a bill to compel the owner to join in a deed to the purchaser.
As to the second question above, the law is equally clear. The
right to redeem remains until the sale is made pursuant to the
power, but not afterwards, unless there is a statute, or some extrinsic
1 The learned Justice suggests the quere whether there could be a postponement

before the day of sale, anless it be for the full time fixed by the statute or the deed.
See also 4 Minn. 488.
Adjournment made at time and place advertised need not be published: Coz vs.
Halstead, 1 Green Ch. 811; s. r. 1 Stockt. 287.
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matter of equity :1 Cordervs. Morgan, supra; Turner vs. Johnson,
10 Ohio 204; 4 Kent 147; .Eatonvs. Whiting, 3 Pick. 484;
Brisbane vs. Stoughton, 17 Ohio 482; Bloom vs. Rensselaer,15 Ill.
506; 7 Johns. Ch. 145; supra, sec. 11. The purchaser's title is
absolute and irredeemable, and the sale bars even infants, heirs,
and married women: .Demarest vs. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129; 7
Id. 45; 10 Ohio 204; supra, sec. 5.
As such sale extinguishes the debtor's equity of redemption
(supra, sec. 11), his only right after the sale is to what surplus
may remain after the liquidation of the debt for which the property
was sold; and as to the premises, he is a mere tenant at sufferance:
Kinsley v. Ames, 2 Met. 29; Bank vs. auttchlick, 14 Pet. 19.
The purchaser is entitled to the crops growing on the land at time
of sale: Shepherd vs. Pilbrick, 2 Denio 174.
As the object of the sale is to cut off the right of redemption,
proceedings to foreclose by notice and sale conclusively acknowledge
the right to redeem, even though such right would not otherwise
exist: Calkins vs. Isbell, 20 N. Y. 147.
If the statute allows a certain time after sale in which to redeem,
then the purchaser acquires an inchoate title, subject to be defeated if redeemed, absolute if not redeemed, in which case it
relates back to the time of purchase. When his title is perfected
by deed, he may maintain case or trover for trespasses 6ommitted by
the mortgagor or others, after the purchase and before the time
for redemption expired: Stout vs. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184; Bich vs.
Baker, 2 Denio 79; 17 Barb. 157; Howard's N. Y. Code 432
(Ed. 1859).
Mere tender within the time does not reinvest mortgagor with
the title. If the tender is refused, resort must be had to chancery:
Smith vs. Anders, 21 Ala. 728.
While on this subject, it may be remarked that general statutes
I Thus where the trustee or mortgagee has power "to sell to the highest bidder
and of the proceeds first to pay," &c., a sale passes an indefeasible and irredeeaable estate to the purchaser: Turner vs. rfohnson, 10 Ohio 204; ohnson vs. Tarner,
7 Ohio, pt. 2, p. 216. But the right to redeem is not barred (unless perhaps in
the case of a bongfide purchaser) by a sale made after a tender of the full amount
due the creditor and a refusal to accept: Burnet vs Detniston, 5 Johns. Oh. 85.
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allowing redemptions from ,sales under decrees of court" have
no application to sales made under powers: Bloom vs. Bensselaer,
15 Ill. 503.
A valid sale under a prior deed of trust cuts off subsequent
mortgages and judgments: Wiswall vs. Ross, 4 Fort. (Ala.) 321 ;
Pahlman vs. Shumway, 24 Ill. 127; Bodine vs. Moore, 18 N. Y.
347; 9 Iowa 407; Brown vs. Bartee, 10 Sm. & Mar. 268. In
this last case (Brown vs. Bartee), it was held that a sale even to
the beneficiary under a prior deed of trust, cut off a subsequent
judgment against the trustor,' even though prior to such sale by
the trustee, but after the judgment, the trustor has conveyed absolutely to the beneficiary.2
A sale under a junior deed of trust carries to the purchaser the
equity of redemption of the grantor .sGraham vs. King, 15 Ala.
563; supra, sec. 11. An attempted sale under a power by whicb
no title passes, will yet amount to an assignment of that part of
the mortgage-debt for which the premises were bid off: Gilbert
vs. Cooley, Walk. Ch. 494; Jackson vs. Bowen, 7 Cow. 13; Grovenor vs. Day, 1 Clark 109. If the purchaser at a cash sale does
not pay the money in a reasonable time, the trustee may treat the
sale as a nullity. If such purchaser has been guilty of unreasonable delay in tendering or paying his bid, equity will not enforce
specific performance at his instance: Reur vs. Rutkowski, 18 Mo.
216.
SEC. 31. The trustee's deed-The title of grantee of trusteetrustee, as we have seen
Praud-Consideration-Covenants.-The
I This word (trustor), the correlative of trustee, "though used in Scotch law,
and in itself very significant and convenient, has not been adopted in England,
and is rarely used in the United States. See 9 Ire. (Law) 191 :" Burrill's Law
Diet. Its convenience and appropriateness should secure its general adoption
and use.
2 As to rights of subsequent lien-holders under New York Statute, see BEenedic

vs. Gilman, 4 Paige 58, Id. 526; Klock vs. Cronkhite, 1 Hill 107; Post vs. Arnot,
2 Denio 344; generally, infra sec. 40.
S Equity will not, except under special circumstances, compel the bolder of a
prior deed of trust, past due, to accept redemption from and to assign the same to
the holder of a. second deed of trust not yet due, as this might enable the latter to
oppress the debtor: Hoow vs. Graham, 21 Mo. 163.
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(supra, sec. 10), takes the legal title upon a declared trust; and the
grantee of the trustee takes the legal title which was before held
by the trustee, and such grantee may recover in ejectment without showing that the trustee, in making the sale, complied with the
conditions by advertising, &c. : Reece vs. Allen, 5 Gillman 236.
The Court of Appeals in Virginia hold the same doctrine, and go
further, and decide that such grantee cannot be defeated in a Court
of law, and may recover possession; although the jury specially
found that the trustee and purchaser were both guilty of fraud at
the time of the sale by the trustee-questions of fraud, unless the
deed is absolutely void, belonging to a Court of Chancery, where
the sale can be set aside or the purchaser treated as a trustee :1
Taylor vs. King, 6 Munf. 858 ; Harrisvs. Harris, Id. 367; Gibson vs. Jones, 5 Leigh 870; Carrington vs.: Goddin, 13 Gratt.
601; Cktristian vs. Yancey, 2 Patton & Heath 240; Skipworth vs.
Cunningham, 8 Leigh 271; 10 Id. 183; Stimpson vs. ries, 2
Jones (Eq.) 156; 7 Ired. (Law) 418; Newman vs. Jackson, 12
Wheat. 570 ;2 Bowan vs. Lamb, 4 G. Greene 468 ; 11 Iowa 589.
But in equity it is different, as the purchaser takes upon himself
the risk of the regularity and fairness of the sale, and on a bill to
set it aside he must prove its regularity: Norman vs. Hill, 2 Patton
& Heath 676 ; infra, sec. 36.
At law, the legal title passes by the conveyance of the trustee,
although he may be guilty of a breach of trust, or fail'to comply
with the terms of the trust: Gale vs. Mensing, 20 Mo. 461; .Bank,
1 The fraud to defeat the deed in a court of law must be fraud in the factum.

rraudulent; representations which may have induced the party to make the deed
or fraud in the consideration, do not avoid the deed at law: Gwynn vs. .todge,4

Jones (Law) 168, and cases.
2 "The

conveyance by the trustee is a sufficient title to enable his alienee to

recover in ejectment, unless the objection that the trustee's notice was so defective
that no title passed to the purchaser is maintainable." Whether the conveyance
by the trustee would pass the legal title if there had bedn no notice at all, the court.
had no occasion to decide: 12 Wheat. 570. That it would not, see -ackson l's. Olarc,

7 Johns. 217, and remarks of Court on page 226, where it is said (the action being
ejectment) that the purchaser must show the regularity of the notice and sale as
part of his title: Miller vs. Hull, 4 Denio 104; King vs. Buntz, 11 Barb. 192

Sherwood vs. Reed, 7 Hill 431; Dana vs. Farrington,4 Minn. 433.
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&o. vs. Benning, 4 Cranch C. C. R. 81; Rowan vs. Lamb, I G
Greene 468. And where the legal title passes, Courts of law cannot take notice of departures of a trustee from the strict terms of
his trust. Questions as to whether the power was discreetly or
regularly exercised belong to a Court of Chancery: Rowan vs.
Lamb, supra; Singleton vs. Scott, 11 Iowa 589; Newman vs.
Jackson, 12 Wheat. 570; Waldron vs. Chasteny, 2 Blatchf. 62;
Bayard vs. Oolefax, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 38; Taylor vs. King, and
cases, supra. But if, as we have seen, proper notice is not given,
or the sale takes place on the wrong day, no title passes.
In ejectment by the alienee of the trustee, the plaintiff is not
bound, as against the debtor or his assignee or vendee, to introduce evidence to establish the debt secured by the deed of trust
or its bond fide character.1 The conveyance is presumed to be
bond fide, and its recitals true, unless directly attacked for fraud :2
Huntley vs. Buckner, 6 Sm. & Mar. 70; Brown vs. Bartee, 10
Id. 268.
The law will not compel the trustee to covenant, except against
his own incumbrances. Yet if, at the sale, he declares that he
can make a good title, he must do so before he can exact the purchase-money: Ennis vs. Leach, 1 Ired. (Eq.) 416. If, however,
the trustee enters into covenants, they will bind him personally:
Hill on Trust. 281, note.
SEC. 32. Setting aside sales-Creneral principles applicable
to.-Being a harsh mode of disposing of the equity of redemption
(supra sec. 3), sales ",should be watched by the courts with a
jealous eye, and should not be sustained unless conducted in all
fairness and integrity :" Per CAToN, J., 15 Ill. 507 ,Upon the
slightest proof of fraud or unfair conduct, or of departure from
the power, they will be instantly set aside," and the party allowed
to redeem: Longwith vs. Butler, 8 Gillman 32, 44. So if proper
,,notice is not given, or the proceedings be in any way cohtrary
1 In .[cCain vs. Wood,. 4 Ala. 258, and several subsequent cases in the same
state, a different but untenable conclusion was reached.
2 Where the trustee executes the trust by making a sale and deed, his power

ceases, and he cannot afterwards bind the parties by a new deed or any recitals
or admissions: Doe vs. Robinson, 24 Miss. 688.
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to equity and justice :" Per TANEY, C. J., Bronson vs. Kinsie, 1
How. 321; 11 Barb. 191; 10 Iowa 408.
If proper persons do not execute *thetrust (supra sec. 14), or
the trustees do not act in person (see. 19) or in good faith, and with
the requisite diligence (sec. 20), or if the power has been extinguished (see. 23), or if proper notices have not been given (see.
25 et seq.), sales made will be set aside on timely application to
Chancery: owan vs. Lamb, 4 G. Greene 468; supra sec. 31.
It may be useful briefly to illustrate the above general principles. Thus if the creditor deceives the debtor by a promise to
extend, and on the faith thereof the debtor goes temporarily away,
a sale made in his absence will be set aside: Schoonhoven vs.
Pratt, 25 Ill. 457.- But the expression of an erroneous opinion
by third persons at the trustee's sale that there is a right of redemption, is no ground for setting the sale aside: Bloom vs. Rensselaer, 15 Ill. 503. But a sale will be set aside if the creditor
pursues a course calculated to prevent competition: 3 Gill 32,
supra. So if sale is made in violation of a valid agreement to extend: 25 Ill. 457. But an innocent purchaser will not be affected
by an unrecorded agreement to extend, and mere possession by
debtor is no notice of such an agreement: Beattie vs. Butler, 21
Mo. 313.
Sales will be set asid*e if the trustee is guilty of fra-id or collusion: Johnson vs. .Eason, 3 Ired. Eq. 330; Jenks vs. Alexander,
11 Paige 619. Or if he makes a sale after tender of full amount
due: 5 Johns. Ch. 35. Or if nothing is due: Wade vs. .Harper,
3 Yerg. 383; Cameron vs. Irwin, 5 Hill 272. .So a sale by a
trustee, where the amount is altogether uncertain and disputed,
Ought not to be made, and is liable to be set aside: Gibson vs.
Jones, 5 Leigh 370; 10 Id. 547; 2 Rob. (Va.) 1; Lane vs. Tdball, 1 Gilmer (Va.) 130; Infra sec. 39.
SEo. 33. Setting aside sales-nadeguayq of price.-Though the
land was duly advertised, and the sale properly made, yet it was
set aside for gross inadequacy alone, and a resale ordered,. the
land being worth $500, and having sold for $50: Wright vs.
Wilson, 2 Yerg. 294. Other courts hold that gross inadequacy
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alone is not sufficient, applying to trustees' sales the rule as to
judicial sales: Singleton vs. Scott, 11 Iowa 589. If the inadequacy is great, the bidders few, and the trustee has not used
diligence and discretion by an adjournment in proper cases (supra'
see. 29), it seems, on principle, that sales under such circumstances
should be set aside if applied for seasonably. But if the inadequacy was occasioned by the acts of the party seeking to set aside
the sales, as where he improperly forbid others to purchase at the
sale, it will not set aside: Jones vs. Neale, 2 Patt. & Heath 839;
.Fordevs. Herron, 4 Munf. 316.
SEC. 34. Setting aside sale-Selli g property en masse.-Here
the directions of the power must be complied with. If the trustee
has a discretion he must not abuse it: Supra see. 20. If by the
terms of the trust a right to sell in parcels is excluded, it should
not be sold in parcels: Quarles vs. Lacy, 4 Munf. 25. If the
debtor has not provided for a sale in parcels, a sale of the entire
tract will not be set aside unless the trustee bad a discretion to
sell less and abused it: Singleton vs. Scott, 11 Iowa 589; 1 Hill
on Trust 143. Where the power is " to sell together or in lots,"
the debtor can object to a sale en masse, unless fraud was worked
or great loss occasioned: Turner vs. Johnson, 10 Ohio 204; s. c.
7 Id. 216, part 2; Lamerson vs. Marvin, 8 Barb. 9; Although
advertised as an entirety, the trustee may, in the exercise of a
wise discretion, sell in parcels : Gray vs. Howard, 14 Mo. 341. If
there is a discretion to sell in parcels, a failure to exercise it wisely
would not, according to WRIGHT, 0. J. (arguendo), 11 Iowa 597,
-vitiate the title of the party purchasing, who was ignorant of
what would be most for the interest of the beneficiary. The trustee
might be liable for an abuse of the trust, but the sale would not be
invalid."
SEC. 35. Setting aside sale because of purchase by nortgagee or
trustee.-Where the power to sell is conferred upon a third erson
the cestui que trust may purchase as freely as any other person:
Lyon vs. Jones, 6 Humph. 533, substantially overruling Wade vs.
Harper, 3 Yerg. 383; Walker vs. Brungard,13 Sm. & Mar. 723.
But as the mortgagee cannot convey to himself he cannot, without
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an enabling statute, purchase at a sale made by himself: Arnot vs.
eClure, 4 Denio 41; Jackson vs. Colden, 4 Cowen 266; 1 Paige
48; 16 Barb. 347; Huff vs. Earle, 3 Port. (Ind.) 306; 7 Id. 699;
Lead. Cas. in Eq. 150; Nichols vs. Baxter, 5 Rh. Island 491; 4
Met. 325; 3 Id. 311; Hyndman vs. Same, 19 Verm. 0; 9 Verm.
164; nor can he procure another to purchase for him: Pettibone
vs. Perkins, 6 Wis. 616; contra, The Rowards vs. Davis, 6 Texas
174. • The trustee cannot buy at his own sale directly or indirectly,
or from the grantor: 3 Humph. 442 ; Bailey vs. Robinson, 1 Gratt.
4; Bobbins vs. Butler, 24 Ill. 387; 2 Dev. (Eq.) 292; 3 Jones (Eq.)
17; 3 Ired. (Eq.) 330; Saltmarsh vs. Beene, 4 Port. (Ala.) 283;
1 Stockt. 218; 11 Foster 70; 3 Harr. 74; 1 Halst. Oh. 319. A
sale to his partner, though for a fair price (3 Yerg. 201), or to his
co-trustee (1 Har. & Gill.), -will be set aside. If he buys in a prior
incumbrance on: the trust estate it will enure to the benefit of the
cestui que trust, the- trustee being reimbursed: Oritchfield vs.
Haynes, 14 Ala. 49; 16 Id. 616; Gunter vs. Jones, 9 Cal. 643.
Where the mortgagee or trustee buys at his own sale, the right of
redemption still attaches: ffyndman vs. Same, 19 Verm. 1;
Benham vs. Rowe, 2 Cal. 387.
But the trustee's purchase at his own sale is not void, and the
beneficiary may repudiate it or hold him to it: Pitt vs. .Petnay,12
Ired. (Law) 69; 7 Id. (Eq.) 150; 9 Rich. (Eq.) 223.' Third persons cannot make the objection or complain: Edmondson vs. Welsh,
27 Ala. 578. Such purchase being voidable simply, the grantee
of the trustee for value and without notice will obtain a good title:
-Bobbins vs. Bates, 4 Cush. 104. Even the trustee's title may be
ratified by knowledge and acquiescence beyond a reasonable time:
Scott vs. Freeland,7 Sm. & Mar. 409. It is no ground for setting
aside the sale (there being no fraud or collusion) that the trustee
knew that the purchaser was bidding for the beneficiary (Luicas vs.
Oliver, 34 Ala. 626), or that the creditor requested the auctioneer
to bid for him a certain sum. But it would be otherwise if the
auctioneer was employed to buy for the creditor as low as possible:
Richards vs. Holmes, 18 How. 143.
SEc. 36. Bill to set aside sale-Onus of Troof.-On a bill by
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trustor or his heirs against trustees and purchasers to set aside the
sale for want of due notice, the onus of proving that proper advertisement was made is on the parties who insist upon or claim under
the sale: Gibson vs. Jones, 5 Leigh 870; Xorman vs. Hills, 2
Patt. & Heath 676; supra, see. 81. And, aside from special
statute, this must be shown by common law evidence: Arnot vs.
McClure, 4 Denio 41; 5 Paige 104.
SEC. 87. When sales will not be set aside- Waiver-Estoppel.There are cases where, though-the power has not been strictly followed or has been exceeded, the sale will not be set aside, as where
the sale has been acquiesced in, the property having brought full
value, the purchaser having made improvements and the parties
seeking relief having been negligent. Such cases stand on special
grounds. As examples, see 8 Leigh 654; Taliaferro vs. Minor, 1
Call 524 ; Caldwell vs. Chapline, 11 Leigh 842 ; 5 Id. 891 ; Pierce
vs. Twiggs, 10 Leigh 406, where infants ineffectually sought relief
from an irregular sale,
So waiver and estoppel apply to such sales. As limitations on
the power are for the benefit of the debtor the latter may waive
them, and he is estopped from objecting that a duty has not been
done which he himself prevented: Beebe vs. De Baum, 3 Eng. 510;
Greenleaf vs. Queen, 1 Pet. 188; -Echols vs. Dinick, 2 Stew. 144;
Poster vs. Goree, 5 Ala. 428; 11 Ala. 514; Gift vs. Anderson, 5
Humph. 577; 14 Verm. 268; Hall vs. Harris, 11 Texas 300; 4
Ired. (Eq.) 288. So irregularities in the mode of sale will be
waived by the debtor if he is present and does not object: Lamb
vs. Goodwin, 10 Ired. (Eq.) 820; Chowning vs. Cox, 1 Rand. 306;
3 Leigh 654.
In Greenleaf vs. Queen, above cited, the purchaser objected that
the trustee had not complied with the requirements of the power,
but the Court replied that as the grantor and beneficiaries waived
all objection no one else could complain. So a stranger'or one
who shows no interest in the property cannot object to irregularities of the trustee in the execution of the power: Hannah vs.
( arrington, 18 Ark. 85; Poster vs. Goree, 5 Ala. 428; Bayard
vs. Colefax, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 88; 16 Ala. 5$1; supra, see. 28.
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In favor of meritorious claimants and innocent purchasers the
presumption is in favor of a valid exercise of the power: Wilburn
vs. Spofford, 4 Sneed 704.
SEc. 38. When bill to set aside sale will not lie-Bill to redeem.It was held in Goldsmith vs. Osborne, 1 Edw. Ch. 560, followed by
Schwarz vs. Sears, Walk. Oh. 170, that a mortgagor cannot maintain a bill to have the sale set aside and the property resold,
.lthough the mortgagee may have abused the power to sell and
bought in the property himself. Both cases hold that his only
remedy is a bill to redeem, offering to pay any amount found or
admitted to be due.'
SEc. 39. When equity will restrain sale-eneral principlesInfants-Special eirdumstances-Disputeddebt or title.-Generally
what woild be good ground for setting aside a sale will be good
ground to restrain a sale. The powers and duty of the trustee.
having been so fully set forth, as well also the reasons for which
sales will be set aside, it need only be remarked that if the trustee
or creditor is acting in bad faith or transcending his power, equity
will enjoin. Indeed some of the courts have held that technical or
formal defects not involving substantial equities will not be regarded
if the debtor has stood by and made no attempt to arrest the sale:
-Doolittlevs. Lewis, 7 Johns. Oh. 45, 50; 10 Johns. 185, 196.
In favor of an infant heir, Chancellor KENT directed the sale to
be made under the direction of a master and further notice to be
given: FTan Bergen vs. .Demarest, 4 Johns. Oh. 37.
Generally no injunction will issue if trustee is only exercisibg in
a fair manner his legal rights: York, &c., B. B . Co..vs. Myers,
41 Maine 109. Yet Chancellors under special circumstances,
where no damagh would be done to the creditor and where otherwise great loss would ensue to the debtor, have indulged the latter
I

We should doubt the entire correctness of these decisions.

It is doubtless

true that the debtor would have no right to file a bill to have the property sold or

resold. But why should a bill not lie to set aside an improper and fraudulent
sale, leaving the creditor the right to make a new sale or file cross-bill to foreclose?
If not set aside, his grantee for value and bona fide would hold.

See very similar

case of Driver vs. Fortner,5 Port. (Ala.) 9, where the court set aside the sale.
The books abound in cases where sales have been set aside.
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with an injunction for a short, limited period. Thus in Platt vs.
McClure, 3 Wood. & Min. 151, a temporary writ was granted
allowing reasonable time to raise the money where- the plaintiff,
belonging to another state, bought the premises subject to certain
mortgages, not recorded, in ignorance that they contained powers
of sale.
Approving the remark of Lord ELDON, 'that it is the duty of the
trustee "to bring the estate to the hammer under every possible
advantage," the courts hold that it is the duty of the trustee to
refuse to sell while clouds are hanging over or disputes concerning
the title exist, which would prevent a sale at the full or fair value
of the property. If the trustee fails thus to do his duty equity
will enjoin, or in a proper case set aside his sale. This relief till
be afforded to any person injured-the debtor or his assigns, a
creditor or subsequent incumbrancers. Applying these principles,
if the trustor ha only an equitable title, but is entitled to the legal
title, the trustee should not sell before getting in the latter title.
And it is even held that in case of a disputed title equity will
enjoin, even if the state of the title was known to all the parties
when the trust deed was executed. So the trustee should not sell
and will be enjoined if the debt is unliquidated and disputed, but
in this case if anything is admitted to be due the debtor applying
for the writ must tender or bring the admitted amount into court.
The amount due should be definitely fixed before sale, otherwise the
creditor must file bill. As authority for the foregoing, see Lane
vs. Tidball, 1 Gil. (Va.) 130; Johnson vs. Eason, 3 Ired. (Eq.)
330; Gibson vs. Jones, 5 Leigh 370 (amount of debt disputed);
Rossett vs. Fisher, 11 Gratt. 499 and- cases; James vs. Gibbs, 1
Patt.. & Heath 277; Hunt vs. Bass, 2 Dev. (Eq.) 292; Fisher vs.
Bassett, 9 Leigh 119; Miller vs. Argyle, 5 Leigh 460; Gay vs.
Hancock, 1 Rand. 72; Ord vs. Noel, 5 Mad. 440; 2 Rob. (Va.) 1;
Wilkins vs. Gordon, 10 Leigh 547, where the trust deed was to
secure a debt "in and about $2000," and the Court held that the
amount should be precisely ascertained before sale; Peck vs. Peck,
9 Yerg. 301; Cole vs. Savage, Clark (N. Y.) R. 361.
On similar grounds, equity will temporarily enjoin, if thereby
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new and further litigation will be avoided: 16 Vesey 267. But a
sale will not be stayed until the different owners of the equity of
redemption shall settle what amount or proportion each is to contribute. They must pay the whole debt, and adjust their rights
afterwards. Yet, in a proper case, the Court will direct the order
of sale of the various parcels : Brinckerhoff vs. Lansing, 4 Johns.
Ch. 65; 1 Id. 447, 425.
If the whole debt is contested on the ground of usury, equity
will enjoin until its validity is established: Harks vs. Morris, 2
Munf. 407. If any amount is admitted to be due by the bill asking for an injunction, it must be tendered before the writ will be
granted: Sloan vs. Coolbaugl, 10 Iowa 30; 7 Id. 33; 11 Id. 242.
SEx. 40. Surplui-To whom distributed-Rightsof debtor and
lien-h7oders.-Contestsabout the surplus remaiffing after a sale are
of frequent oceurrence. Space does not allow an extended discussion. We indicate some of the more important principles, rbferring
to the authorities cited for their application and illustration.
As a sale on a second deed of trust does. not exonerate the property from the lien of the first, any surplus from a sale on the
second deed will be applied in payment of the third, and not of the
first: Helweg vs. Heiteamp, 20 Mo. 569.
If there are no subsequent liens, the surplus belongs to the
grantor or his assigns: Goulden vs. Buckelew, 4 Cal. 107; Pierce
vs. Robinson, 13 Id. 116; see also cases cited infra. In this
country the surplus goes to the heirs, and is assets: 1 Johns. Ch.
119.' Representing the equity of redemption, the widow is dowable in it: Hinchman vs. Stites, 1 Stockt. 454. The .debtor may
assign this surplus, but not so as to defeat liens on the land existing
at the time of the assignment: Doniphan vs. Paxton, 19 Mo. 288;
Palmer vs. Yarborough, 1 Ired. (Eq.) 310.
Judgments, in most of the States (supra, see. 11. and note), are
liens upon the residuary interest of the trustor, subject to the in.
I In a recent case in Illinois, the Supreme Court, after holding that judgments
were liens on the grantor's equity of redemption, decided that the general executor of the debtor was entitled to the surplus in preference to the judgmentcreditors: Pahimanvs. Shumway, 24 Ill. 127. With great deference it is submitted
that this conclusion is untenable.
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cumbrance of the deed of trust. And sales under the latter cut
off the former.
Although the decisions are not in full accord, the weight of
authority and the better opinion will warrant the following propositions: that to entitle the judgment-creditor to a lien on or to follow
the surplus, his. judgment or execution must be a lien on the premises ; if thus a lien, he has a right to follow the surplus, and this
right cannot be destroyed or postponed by levy or garnishment on
behalf of a subsequent judgment-creditor; but the surplus will be
distributed in the order of the liens, whether by judgment or mortgage, on the land out of which it arose: Bodine vs. Moore, 18 N.
Y. 347; Calkins vs. Isbell, 20 Id. 152; White vs. Watkins, 23
Mo. 429; Doniphan vs. Paxton, 19 Id. 288; Kennedy vs. Hammond, 16 Id. 341; Cook vs. Dillon, 9 Iowa 407; Pahiman vs.
S"humway, 24 Ill. 127; Presnell vs. Landers, 5 Ired. (Eq.) 251;
Harrison vs. Battle, 1 Dev. (Eq.) 541; 31 Miss. 128; 1 Ired.
(Eq.) 310; Chase vs. Parker,14 Iowa (not yet reported); Bartlett
vs. Gage, 4 Paige 503; 1 Id. 181, 558, 635; Averill vs. Loucks,
6 Barb. S. 0. R. 470 ; Eddy vs. Smith, 18 Wend. 488 ; Waller vs.
Harris,7 Paige 167; s. C., 20 Wend. 555. If there are no such
liens, and it has not been assigned, it may, of course, be attached,
garnisheed, or otherwise reached in the hands of the trustee as the
debtor's: Heam vs. Crutcher, 4 Yerg. 461; Hill on Trust. 344,
note and cases.
It is stated, arguendo, in Cook vs. Dillon, supra, that the trustee
is not bound to take notice of or search for subsequent judgments oi
liens, and that if such lien-holders do not notify him of their rights,
he will be without fault and without liability, if he pays the surplus
J. F. D.
over to the creator of the trust.
Davenport, Iowa.

